Conditional Political Budget Cycles
University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Finance, Investment and Banking
Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3352
This Paper uses a large new panel data set to examine the relationship between elections and fiscal policy. We find clear evidence of political business cycles in macroeconomic policy: spending increases before elections while revenues fall, leading to a larger deficit in election years. We also show that there are large systematic differences between developed and developing countries in the size and composition of the electoral policy cycles. We propose a moral hazard model of electoral competition to explain these differences. In the model, the sizes of the electoral budget cycles depend on the rents of remaining in power and the share of informed voters in the electorate. Using suitable proxies, we find that these institutional features explain a large part of the difference in policy cycles between developed and developing countries.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: Political budget cycles, dynamic panel estimation, developing countries
JEL Classification: D72, E62, P16, P26
Date posted: June 6, 2002
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.609 seconds