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Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry


Henry Hansmann


Yale Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Daniel P. Kessler


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mark B. McClellan


Brookings Institution; Council of Economic Advisors; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Stanford Graduate School of Business

June 2002

NBER Working Paper No. w8989

Abstract:     
Over the past 20 years, demand for acute care hospital services has declined more rapidly than has hospital capacity. This paper investigates the extent to which the preponderance of the nonprofit form in this industry might account for this phenomenon. We test whether rates of exit from the hospital industry differ significantly across the different forms of ownership, and especially whether secular nonprofit hospitals reduce capacity more slowly than do other types of hospitals. We estimate the effect of population changes (a proxy for changes in demand) at the zip-code level between 1985 and 1994 on changes in the capacity of for-profit, secular nonprofit, religious nonprofit, and public hospitals over the same period, holding constant metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects and other 1985 baseline characteristics of residential zip codes. We find that for-profit hospitals are the most responsive to reductions in demand, followed in turn by public and religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals, while secular nonprofits are distinctly the least responsive of the four ownership types.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

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Date posted: June 7, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Hansmann, Henry, Kessler, Daniel P. and McClellan, Mark B., Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry (June 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w8989. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=315339

Contact Information

Henry Hansmann
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4966 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Daniel Philip Kessler (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-4492 (Phone)
650-725-6152 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Mark B. McClellan
Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Council of Economic Advisors ( email )
Eisenhower Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20502
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
Landau Economics Building
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-3982 (Phone)
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