SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (9)

Beta

 
 

Footnotes (47)

Beta

 


 



Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform

Joni Hersch
Vanderbilt University Law School; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management


May 2002

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 362

Abstract:     
A substantial recent literature has documented the inability of jurors to make sound decisions with respect to punitive damages, particularly for health, safety, and environmental torts. Included in this literature are experimental studies documenting the better performance of judges than jurors for the same case scenarios. Recent research by Eisenberg et al. (2002) has suggested, however, that there is no significant difference between the performance of judges and jurors with respect to punitive damages. Our paper provides a critical assessment of this finding as well as a detailed statistical analysis of the state court data upon which the Eisenberg et al. claim is based. Our analysis starts with a review of very large punitive damages awards. We found that 98 percent of the large punitive damages awards were made by juries and only two percent by judges. The jury awards in these large cases were highly unpredictable and were weakly correlated with compensatory damages. We then analyze data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996, which is the data set used by Eisenberg et al. Our analysis of the state court data set contradicts Eisenberg et al.'s analysis. We find that juries are significantly more likely to award punitive damages than are judges; juries award higher levels of punitive damages; and juries are largely responsible for extremely large punitive damages awards. Juries also tend to award higher compensatory damages, which in turn will often boost the punitive damages award. This paper also discusses the reasons why our results contradict the findings by Eisenberg et al.

JEL Classifications: K00, K13, K41

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 07, 2002 ; Last revised: September 06, 2004

Suggested Citation

Hersch, Joni and Viscusi, W. Kip, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform (May 2002). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 362. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=315349 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.315349


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

W. Kip Viscusi (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7715 (Phone)
615-322-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
Joni Hersch
Vanderbilt University Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7717 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/go/phdlawecon
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,679
Downloads: 465
Download Rank: 16,649
Citations: 9
Footnotes: 47

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollo1 in 0.156 seconds.