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The New Institutional Economics of Antitrust and Regulation


Frank Bickenbach


University of Kiel - Research Dept. 3 (Regional and Infrastructure Economics)

Lars Kumkar


University of Kiel - Research Dept. 3 (Regional and Infrastructure Economics)

Rüdiger Soltwedel


University of Kiel - Research Dept. 3 (Regional and Infrastructure Economics)

December 1999

Kiel Working Paper No. 961

Abstract:     
Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focusses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the economics of complex vertical and horizontal coordination problems. It sketches the specific view of NIE at industrial organization, antitrust and regulation, discusses three current issues - the European antitrust policy concerning complex vertical contracts, regulatory reform of the electricity industry and the allocation of regulatory competencies in the EU - and presents some implications of NIE for economic policy making, research and advisory activities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 74

JEL Classification: D23, D72, H11, K21, K23, L22, L42, L43, L51

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Date posted: June 19, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Bickenbach, Frank and Kumkar, Lars and Soltwedel, Rüdiger, The New Institutional Economics of Antitrust and Regulation (December 1999). Kiel Working Paper No. 961. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=315742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.315742

Contact Information

Frank Bickenbach
University of Kiel - Research Dept. 3 (Regional and Infrastructure Economics) ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
D-24100
Kiel
Germany
Lars Kumkar (Contact Author)
University of Kiel - Research Dept. 3 (Regional and Infrastructure Economics) ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
D-24100
Kiel
Germany
Rüdiger Soltwedel
University of Kiel - Research Dept. 3 (Regional and Infrastructure Economics) ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
D-24100
Kiel
Germany
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