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The Differential Calculus of ConsentFrancesco ParisiUniversity of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna Jonathan KlickUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. 20, No. 2-3, 2002 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-18 Abstract: Existing treatments of the choice of an optimal voting rule ignore the effects of the rule on political bargaining. Specifically, more stringent majority requirements reduce intra-coalitional free riding in political compromise, leading to greater gains from political trade. Once this benefit of increasing the vote share necessary to enact a proposal is recognized, we suggest that the optimal voting rule in the presence of transactions costs will actually be closer to unanimity than the optimal majority derived by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16 Keywords: analysis of collective decisions, welfare economics JEL Classification: D6, D7 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: June 20, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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