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http://ssrn.com/abstract=316482
 
 

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The Differential Calculus of Consent


Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center


Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. 20, No. 2-3, 2002
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-18

Abstract:     
Existing treatments of the choice of an optimal voting rule ignore the effects of the rule on political bargaining.
Specifically, more stringent majority requirements reduce intra-coalitional free riding in political compromise, leading to greater gains from political trade. Once this benefit of increasing the vote share necessary to enact a proposal is recognized, we suggest that the optimal voting rule in the presence of transactions costs will actually be closer to unanimity than the optimal majority derived by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: analysis of collective decisions, welfare economics

JEL Classification: D6, D7

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Date posted: June 20, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Klick, Jonathan, The Differential Calculus of Consent. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. 20, No. 2-3, 2002; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=316482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.316482

Contact Information

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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