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Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland
Matthias Benz University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW) Alois Stutzer University of Basel - Department of Business and Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) November 2002 Inst. for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 119 Abstract: Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary substantially depending on the political system under which citizens live. Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, we present empirical evidence that citizens are politically better informed when they have more extended political participation rights. The results corroborate theoretical arguments and circumstantial evidence that voter information should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions.
Keywords: voter competence, direct democracy, information costs, rational ignorance JEL Classifications: D70, D80, H00 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: September 13, 2002 ; Last revised: January 19, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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