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Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland

Matthias Benz
University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)

Alois Stutzer
University of Basel - Department of Business and Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)


November 2002

Inst. for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 119

Abstract:     
Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary substantially depending on the political system under which citizens live. Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, we present empirical evidence that citizens are politically better informed when they have more extended political participation rights. The results corroborate theoretical arguments and circumstantial evidence that voter information should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions.

Keywords: voter competence, direct democracy, information costs, rational ignorance

JEL Classifications: D70, D80, H00

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 13, 2002 ; Last revised: January 19, 2004

Suggested Citation

Benz, Matthias and Stutzer, Alois, Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland (November 2002). Inst. for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 119. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=316694 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.316694


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Contact Information

Matthias Benz (Contact Author)
University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW) ( email )
Bluemlisalpstrasse 10
CH-8006 Zurich 8006
Switzerland
Alois Stutzer
University of Basel - Department of Business and Economics ( email )
Petersgraben 51
4003 Basel Switzerland
0041 61 267 3361 (Phone)
0041 61 267 3340 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/wifor/staff/as/as.htm
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
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