Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games
Kenton K. Yee
Mellon Capital Management
International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003
Abstract:
Two new evolutionary game models are presented where ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.
Keywords: property, trade, evolutionary games, ownership, game theory, sociobiology, property rights
JEL Classification: K0,C7,C73,K1,K2,D7,L0,Z1,E11
Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 5, 2002
Suggested CitationYee, Kenton K., Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=319103
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