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When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with HandicapsMarkus WalzlRWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) Eberhard FeessFrankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH Gerd MuehlheusserUniversity of Hamburg; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) June 2002 Bonn Econ. Discussion Paper No. 14/2002 Abstract: We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We fully characterize the equilibrium strategies for this auction format and show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23 Keywords: All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information JEL Classification: D44, D88 working papers seriesDate posted: August 21, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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