Golden Parachute as a Compensation Shifting Mechanism
24 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2002
There are 3 versions of this paper
Golden Parachute as a Compensation Shifting Mechanism
Golden Parachute as a Compensation Shifting Mechanism
Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism
Date Written: August 4, 2003
Abstract
We demonstrate how a golden parachute can be used to improve the target shareholders' net return by partially shifting the managerial compensation burden to the buyer through a higher acquisition price. Consistent with the empirical observations, we show that 1) golden parachute will be contingent on a change-of-control rather than solely on the manager's layoff, 2) golden parachute will be promised early, e.g., at the time of the manager's employment, not just in the face of a takeover or a merger, 3) the shareholders would want to extend its coverage to other employees, and 4) the size of the parachute would be much larger than the manager's annual compensation.
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