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Financial Disclosure Management by Nonprofit Organizations
Ranjani Krishnan Michigan State University - Department of Accounting & Information Systems Michelle Yetman University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management Robert J. Yetman University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management July 19, 2002 Abstract: This paper examines how nonprofit organizations respond to incentives to manage their publicly available financial information. Prior research identifies two operating ratios donors commonly use to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of nonprofits (i.e., the program service ratio, defined as the fraction of total expenses committed to advancing the charitable mission of the organization, and the fundraising ratio, defined as the ratio of fundraising expenses to donations revenue). Nonprofit managers have an incentive to over-report the expenses classified as program services and under-report the expenses classified as administrative and fundraising in order to improve these ratios. We examine whether nonprofits respond to these incentives, and we find evidence consistent with opportunistic cost shifting to improve the program service and fundraising ratios. Additional analysis finds that smaller nonprofits that are more reliant on donations revenue manipulate their operating ratios to a greater extent.
Keywords: nonprofit organizations, earnings management, disclosure, hospitals JEL Classifications: M41, M43, M48, L31 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: September 30, 2002 ; Last revised: January 10, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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