Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=320888
 
 

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Inherited Control and Firm Performance


Francisco Perez-Gonzalez


Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 2002



Abstract:     
This paper examines the impact of inherited control on firms' performance. To address this issue, I use data from management successions where the departing chief executive officer (CEO) was a member of the controlling family of the corporation. I find that firms where control is inherited undergo large declines in return on assets and market-to-book ratios that are not experienced by firms that promote CEOs not related to the controlling family. Consistent with wasteful nepotism, I find that these declines are particularly prominent in firms that appoint family CEOs that did not attend a selective college. Overall, the results strongly suggest that nepotism hurts firms' performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: corporate governance, family firms, nepotism, firm performance, CEO successions

JEL Classification: G32, G34, M13

working papers series


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Date posted: October 3, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Perez-Gonzalez, Francisco, Inherited Control and Firm Performance (July 2002). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=320888 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.320888

Contact Information

Francisco Perez-Gonzalez (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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