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Incentives and Wage Rigidity


Edward P. Lazear


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

March 1984

NBER Working Paper No. w1299

Abstract:     
With the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives. Some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries. it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity. Many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect: That is, they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall. This paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

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Date posted: May 26, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Lazear, Edward P., Incentives and Wage Rigidity (March 1984). NBER Working Paper No. w1299. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=321341

Contact Information

Edward P. Lazear (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9136 (Phone)
650-723-0498 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
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