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Letter to FCC Chairman Powell Concerning Auction 35Peter CramtonUniversity of Maryland - Department of Economics Robert W. CrandallBrookings Institution; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Robert W. HahnUniversity of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University Robert G. HarrisUniversity of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group Jerry A. HausmanMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Thomas W. HazlettGeorge Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law Douglas LichtmanUniversity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law Paul W. MacAvoyYale School of Management; Yale Graduates Energy Study Group Paul R. MilgromStanford University Gregory SidakTilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University; Criterion Economics, L.L.C. Richard SchmalenseeMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Hal J. SingerNavigant Economics LLC Vernon L. SmithChapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law William E. Taylor IIIMarsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office David TeeceUniversity of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group August 16, 2002 Abstract: Fifteen scholars on auctions and telecommunications regulation urge the FCC to cancel bids made in, or permit winning bidders to opt out of, the reauction of the NextWave licenses in Auction 35. For auctions to function efficiently, buyers and sellers must follow basic rules, including the rule that a seller deliver in a timely manner what the winning bidder has purchased. This rule has not been applied in Auction 35. The FCC auctioned something that it did not have - immediate access to the spectrum for the winning bidders. Thus, if the FCC forces the winning bidders to pay, they will sue the agency for forcing them to pay for something that they did not receive. Alternatively, their shareholders will sue the companies. Meanwhile, wireless carriers have invested in less efficient technologies to meet capacity needs. The FCC has said that its current policy toward Auction 35 seeks to "protect the integrity" of the spectrum auction process. The opposite is already occurring. The FCC increases uncertainty in the wireless market if it holds carriers accountable for winning bids for licenses that the agency cannot deliver. Bidders will discount their future bids accordingly, and auction revenues will fall. That outcome does not benefit consumers, taxpayers, workers, or shareholders.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 3 JEL Classification: A1,E6,E61,H8,K2,K23,L5,L51,O3,O31,O38 working papers seriesDate posted: December 6, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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