Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=325961
 
 

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Markets for Attention: Will Postage for Email Help?


Shyam Sunder


Yale University - School of Management

Robert E. Kraut


Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business; Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science

James Morris


Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science

Rahul Telang


Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Darrin Filer


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Matthew A. Cronin


George Mason University - School of Management

August 2002

Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-28

Abstract:     
Balancing the needs of information distributors and their audiences has grown harder in the age of the Internet. While the demand for attention continues to increase rapidly with the volume of information and communication, the supply of human attention is relatively fixed. Markets are a social institution for efficiently balancing supply and demand of scarce resources. Charging a price for sending messages may help discipline senders from demanding more attention than they are willing to pay for. Price may also help recipients estimate the value of a message before reading it. We report the results of two laboratory experiments to explore the consequences of a pricing system for electronic mail. Charging postage for email causes senders to be more selective and send fewer messages. However, recipients did not use the postage paid by senders as a signal of importance. These studies suggest markets for attention have potential, but their design needs more work.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: Computer Mediated Communication, Electronic Mail, Empirical Studies, Economics, Markets, Social Impact, Spam

JEL Classification: D40, L86, L96, M21

working papers series


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Date posted: August 28, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Sunder, Shyam and Kraut, Robert E. and Morris, James and Telang, Rahul and Filer, Darrin and Cronin, Matthew A., Markets for Attention: Will Postage for Email Help? (August 2002). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=325961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.325961

Contact Information

Shyam Sunder (Contact Author)
Yale University - School of Management ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-6160 (Phone)
203-432-6974 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder/
Robert E. Kraut
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-7694 (Phone)
412-268-1266 (Fax)
Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States
James H. Morris
Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States
412-268-2574 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~jhm/
Rahul Telang
Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )
4800 Forbes Ave
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-1155 (Phone)
Darrin Filer
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Matthew A. Cronin
George Mason University - School of Management ( email )
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  20
Citations:  8

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