Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities
University of Siena - Department of Economics; Central European University (CEU)
Maria Alessandra Rossi
University of Siena - Department of Economics
University of Siena Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 355
In the New Property Rights model ownership of assets should be assigned to the most capable agents. While, in a world of incomplete contracts, the application of the model to IPRs provides insights on the nature of their second best allocation, also the opposite direction of causation may arise: owners of IPRs tend to develop more capabilities in the production of new IPRs. For some firms and countries, a virtuous complementarity between the development of IPRs and skills arises. For others the disincentive effect of the exclusion from intellectual property has more damaging consequences than the lack of access to material capital.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Intellectual Property, Incomplete contracts, Incentives, Efficient Allocation, Institutional Complementarity
JEL Classification: D23, K11, K12, O34
Date posted: November 25, 2002
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