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Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional ComplementaritiesUgo PaganoUniversity of Siena - Department of Economics; Central European University (CEU) Maria Alessandra RossiUniversity of Siena - Department of Economics July 2002 University of Siena Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 355 Abstract: In the New Property Rights model ownership of assets should be assigned to the most capable agents. While, in a world of incomplete contracts, the application of the model to IPRs provides insights on the nature of their second best allocation, also the opposite direction of causation may arise: owners of IPRs tend to develop more capabilities in the production of new IPRs. For some firms and countries, a virtuous complementarity between the development of IPRs and skills arises. For others the disincentive effect of the exclusion from intellectual property has more damaging consequences than the lack of access to material capital.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27 Keywords: Intellectual Property, Incomplete contracts, Incentives, Efficient Allocation, Institutional Complementarity JEL Classification: D23, K11, K12, O34 working papers seriesDate posted: November 25, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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