Abstract

 


 



Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions


David L. Kaserman


Auburn University, College of Business, Department of Economics (Deceased)


Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Vol. 18, 2002

Abstract:     
A severe and chronic shortage of cadaveric organs available for transplantation has now persisted for over three decades. That shortage, in turn, has spawned an extensive literature debating the merits of various alternative policy remedies. Among these, perhaps the most promising is a lifting of the legal ban on cadaveric organ purchases, thereby allowing markets to form and organ prices to rise to market-clearing levels. That solution, however, has not been well received by many writing in this area. The opposition that has surfaced, however, appears to be due, at least in part, to some fundamental misconceptions regarding some basic economic concepts and how those concepts might apply to the operation of organ markets. Four such misconceptions that have plagued the literature in this area are identified here and the relevant economic principles are clarified.

JEL Classification: I11, K4, L5

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: September 19, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Kaserman, David L., Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions. Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Vol. 18, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=327260

Contact Information

David L. Kaserman (Contact Author)
Auburn University, College of Business, Department of Economics (Deceased)
N/A
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