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Local Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural ChinaLoren BrandtUniversity of Toronto - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Scott RozelleUniversity of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Matthew TurnerUniversity of Toronto 2002 UC Davis Working Paper No. 02-004 Abstract: We examine the ongoing transition from centrally planned to market agriculture in rural China. In particular, we examine the devolution of land rights from village governments to villagers and the corresponding evolution of tenure security in agricultural land. We find econometric support for the statistical and economic importance of four explanations for local government behavior. Three of these explanations indicate a link between the incentives and constraints faced by village leaders and property rights in agricultural land, and hence suggest policy levers to encourage more secure property rights.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43 Keywords: devolution of land rights, evolution of tenure security, local government behavior JEL Classification: R52, Q13 working papers seriesDate posted: April 4, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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