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The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law
Marcel Kahan New York University - School of Law Ehud Kamar University of Southern California - Gould School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 679, 2002 Abstract: This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that states compete for incorporations. Delaware aside, no state stands to gain meaningful tax revenues or legal business from chartering firms, and no state takes significant steps to attract incorporations. The explanation for this apathy lies in a combination of economic entry barriers and political factors. This analysis of the market for incorporations has implications for the present structure of corporate law, for the desirability of federal intervention, and for theories of regulatory competition in general.
Keywords: Delaware, Incorporation, Corporate Charters, Corporate Governance, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Barriers to Entry, Network Externalities, Federalism, Legislation, Public Choice, Political Economy, Franchise Tax JEL Classifications: G30, G38, H70, K22, H25, H71, H73, L13, R58 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: January 02, 2003 ; Last revised: November 08, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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