SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (17)

Beta

 
 

Footnotes (262)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law

Marcel Kahan
New York University - School of Law

Ehud Kamar
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)



Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 679, 2002

Abstract:     
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that states compete for incorporations. Delaware aside, no state stands to gain meaningful tax revenues or legal business from chartering firms, and no state takes significant steps to attract incorporations. The explanation for this apathy lies in a combination of economic entry barriers and political factors. This analysis of the market for incorporations has implications for the present structure of corporate law, for the desirability of federal intervention, and for theories of regulatory competition in general.

Keywords: Delaware, Incorporation, Corporate Charters, Corporate Governance, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Barriers to Entry, Network Externalities, Federalism, Legislation, Public Choice, Political Economy, Franchise Tax

JEL Classifications: G30, G38, H70, K22, H25, H71, H73, L13, R58

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: January 02, 2003 ; Last revised: November 08, 2005

Suggested Citation

Kahan, Marcel and Kamar, Ehud, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 679, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=334120 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.334120


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Ehud Kamar (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
(213) 740-4791 (Phone)
(213) 740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=225
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Marcel Kahan
New York University - School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6268 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,825
Downloads: 681
Download Rank: 9,126
Citations: 17
Footnotes: 262
People who downloaded
this paper also downloaded:

1. The Market for Corporate Law
By Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza, ...

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo2 in 0.140 seconds.