The Minimal Dominant Set is a Nonempty Core Extension
Laszlo A. Koczy
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies; Keleti Faculty of Economics, Óbuda University
FEEM Working Paper No. 50.2003; Catholic U of Leuven, Econometrics Working Paper No. 05/02
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Core, Non-emptiness, Indirect Dominance, Outsider Independence
JEL Classification: C71working papers series
Date posted: October 28, 2002
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