Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=336240
 
 

References (40)



 
 

Citations (87)



 


 



Endogenous Political Institutions


Philippe Aghion


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alberto F. Alesina


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Francesco Trebbi


University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 2002

Harvard Institute Research Working Paper No. 1957

Abstract:     
Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post
checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 22, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Alesina, Alberto F. and Trebbi, Francesco, Endogenous Political Institutions (June 2002). Harvard Institute Research Working Paper No. 1957. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=336240 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.336240

Contact Information

Philippe Aghion
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-6675 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Francesco Trebbi
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics ( email )
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/ftrebbi/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,982
Downloads: 467
Download Rank: 30,092
References:  40
Citations:  87

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.297 seconds