What Really Matters in Auction Design

Paul Klemperer

University of Oxford - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2002

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all".

Keywords: Auctions, Antitrust, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Collusion, Entry Deterrence, Predation, Takeover Battles, Ascending Auction, Sealed-Bid Auction, Winner's Curse, Uniform Price Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Anglo-Dutch Auction, Electricity, TV franchise, Football TV-rights, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Competition Policy

JEL Classification: D44, L41, L96

Accepted Paper Series

Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 6, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Klemperer, Paul, What Really Matters in Auction Design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=336621

Contact Information

Paul Klemperer (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
+44 1865 278 588 (Phone)
+44 1865 278 557 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 649

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.313 seconds