Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=336800
 
 

References (29)



 
 

Citations (27)



 


 



In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance


Sharun Mukand


Tufts University - Department of Economics

Dani Rodrik


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

August 2002

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3525

Abstract:     
We consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country's own circumstances, but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little 'policy experimentation'. Corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently. Our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation, corruption, and economic performance as a function of a country's location vis-a-vis successful leaders. In particular, it predicts a U-shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics: close neighbors should do very well, distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance, and intermediate countries worst of all. An empirical test with the experience of post-socialist countries provides supportive results.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Institutions, economic growth, convergence

JEL Classification: O10, O40

working papers series


Date posted: October 11, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Mukand, Sharun and Rodrik, Dani, In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance (August 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3525. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=336800

Contact Information

Sharun Mukand (Contact Author)
Tufts University - Department of Economics ( email )
Medford, MA 02155
United States
617-627-5476 (Phone)
617-627-3917 (Fax)
Dani Rodrik
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9454 (Phone)
617-496-5747 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rodrik/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 658
Downloads: 29
References:  29
Citations:  27

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.437 seconds