Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=339460
 
 

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Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change


Vincy Fon


George Washington University - Department of Economics

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Ben Depoorter


University of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics


European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, July 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-26

Abstract:     
In this paper we consider the role that litigation and case selection play in the process of legal change. We examine the effect of judicial path dependence on the consolidation of liability rules and legal remedies, paying special attention to litigation between parties with different stakes. In the presence of asymmetric stakes, judicial path dependence may lead to consolidation or contraction of legal rules. We study the consequence of private litigation decisions on the contraction or consolidation of legal rules under various litigation and judicial environments. We also consider the relevance of the degree of asymmetry in the litigation stakes, the existence and nature of positive litigation costs, and the weight of past precedents on the ongoing process of legal evolution.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

JEL Classification: K0, K40, K13, K41

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Date posted: November 9, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Fon, Vincy and Parisi, Francesco and Depoorter, Ben, Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change. European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, July 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-26. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=339460

Contact Information

Vincy Fon (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )
2115 G Street, N.W.
Monroe Hall, #366
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7580 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Ben Depoorter
University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics ( email )
Ghent Univ. Law School
Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, 9000
Belgium
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