University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
September 25, 2002
MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-32
Most corporate finance models of firm behavior study the typical US corporation: one firm with a large set of dispersed shareholders. In contrast, in many countries around the world, firms are often held in groups with complicated ownership structures. These groups, often referred to as pyramids, raise very distinct questions about firm behavior; these questions that are especially relevant for developing countries where these groups are most prevalent. In this paper, we first describe some empirical research we have performed on the nature of agency problems within pyramids. We then discuss a variety of questions, both theoretical and empirical, that remain to be unexplored.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Pyramids, Corporate Governance, Development
JEL Classification: J3
Date posted: October 16, 2002
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