Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=339480
 
 

Citations (8)



 
 

Footnotes (2)



 


 



Pyramids


Marianne Bertrand


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Sendhil Mullainathan


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 25, 2002

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-32

Abstract:     
Most corporate finance models of firm behavior study the typical US corporation: one firm with a large set of dispersed shareholders. In contrast, in many countries around the world, firms are often held in groups with complicated ownership structures. These groups, often referred to as pyramids, raise very distinct questions about firm behavior; these questions that are especially relevant for developing countries where these groups are most prevalent. In this paper, we first describe some empirical research we have performed on the nature of agency problems within pyramids. We then discuss a variety of questions, both theoretical and empirical, that remain to be unexplored.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Pyramids, Corporate Governance, Development

JEL Classification: J3

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 16, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Bertrand, Marianne and Mullainathan, Sendhil, Pyramids (September 25, 2002). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=339480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.339480

Contact Information

Marianne Bertrand
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-5943 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/marianne.bertrand/vita/cv_0604.pdf
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-588-0341 (Phone)
617-876-2742 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Sendhil Mullainathan (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2720 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-588-1473 (Phone)
617-876-2742 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 12,910
Downloads: 957
Download Rank: 12,517
Citations:  8
Footnotes:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.375 seconds