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Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules

Simon J. Evenett
University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Bernard Hoekman
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


January 2004

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3195

Abstract:     
The effects on national welfare and market access of two important public procurement practices (discrimination and non-transparency) are analyzed with an eye to the ongoing discussions on procurement reform in the Doha Round. The analysis suggests that the welfare payoffs of adopting mechanisms that foster domestic competition and transparency are likely to be greater than the return to efforts to ban international discrimination. However improved transparency, which may well reduce corruption, is unlikely to also result in significant enhancements in market access. This in turn raises questions about the likely enforceability of a WTO agreement on transparency in procurement.

Keywords: Government procurement, public purchasing, WTO, transparency, corruption, Doha Round

JEL Classifications: F1, F13, H57

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 23, 2003 ; Last revised: December 30, 2004

Suggested Citation

Evenett, Simon J. and Hoekman, Bernard, Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules (January 2004). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3195. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=342380


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Contact Information

Simon J. Evenett (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford OX1 1HP
Great Britain
44 1865 288 875 (Phone)
44 1865 288 805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Bernard Hoekman
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-1185 (Phone)
202-676-9810 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/bhoekman
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
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