Edward T. Swaine
George Washington University Law School
Duke Law Journal, Vol. 52, p. 559, 2002
U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 13
U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 167
This article agrees with recent papers that rational choice analysis may be a useful heuristic for customary international law, which is plagued by an incoherent approach to state interests. The theory's initial application, however, has been flawed and unduly truncated, and I provide additional illustrations from game theory and of customary rules to illustrate the point. Rational choice analysis not only explains why certain customary international law may legitimately be regarded as obligatory, thus redeeming an important legal institution, but also indicates important directions for reform.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 69
Keywords: customary international law, public international law, rational choice
JEL Classification: D78, K33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 3, 2002
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