Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=343120
 
 

References (44)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



The Cost of Delegated Control: Vicarious Liability, Secondary Liability and Mandatory Insurance


Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-475, December 2003
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-27

Abstract:     
Vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance are three systems to attain judgment-proof or disappearing injurers' precaution through the direct control of a second party (the vicariously liable principal, the secondary liable party, or the insurer). In this way, the legal system delegates control over some injurers to private entities. Such mechanisms generate monitoring costs. In this paper, we consider who bears the cost of such monitoring and the effect thereof on the equilibrium level of precautions under different liability rules. We use these findings to explain some of the patterns in the coupling of substantive standards of liability and legal regimes of delegated control.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: vicarious liability, secondary liability, insurance, negligence

JEL Classification: K13

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 12, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Parisi, Francesco, The Cost of Delegated Control: Vicarious Liability, Secondary Liability and Mandatory Insurance. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-475, December 2003; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-27. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=343120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.343120

Contact Information

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roeterstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://darimattiacci.acle.nl
Tinbergen Institute
Roetersstraat 31
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AuUfjxUAAAAJ&hl=en
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,748
Downloads: 868
Download Rank: 13,874
References:  44
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.235 seconds