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Corporate Governance and Control
Marco Becht Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Patrick Bolton Columbia Business School - Department of Economics Ailsa Röell Princeton University - Bendheim Center for Finance October 2002 ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002 Abstract: Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be proven effective.
Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership, takeovers, block holders, boards JEL Classifications: G32, G34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: October 31, 2002 ; Last revised: April 03, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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