Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461
 
 

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Corporate Governance and Control


Marco Becht


Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Patrick Bolton


Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ailsa Röell


Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs

October 2002

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002

Abstract:     
Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be proven effective.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 128

Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership, takeovers, block holders, boards

JEL Classification: G32, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: October 31, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco and Bolton, Patrick and Röell, Ailsa, Corporate Governance and Control (October 2002). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.343461

Contact Information

Marco Becht
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )
19 Av Franklin Roosevelt
1050
Brussels
Belgium
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Avenue des Statuaires 120
Brussels, 1180
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Ailsa A. Röell
Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-9289 (Phone)
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References:  579
Citations:  238

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