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Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis

Ian Ayres
Yale Law School; Yale School of Management

John J. Donohue III
Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


October 2002

Stanford Law & Econ. Working Paper 247; Stanford Public Law Research Paper 44; Yale Public Law Research Paper 28; Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper 272

Abstract:     
John Lott and David Mustard have used regression analysis to argue forcefully that "shall-issue" laws (which give citizens an unimpeded right to secure permits for concealed weapons) reduce violent crime. While certain facially plausible statistical models appear to generate this conclusion, more refined analyses of more recent state and county data undermine the more guns, less crime hypothesis. The most robust finding on the state data is that certain property crimes rise with passage of shall-issue laws, although the absence of any clear theory as to why this would be the case tends to undercut any strong conclusions. Estimating more statistically preferred disaggregated models on more complete county data, we show that in most states shall-issue laws have been associated with more crime and that the apparent stimulus to crime tends to be especially strong for those states that adopted in the last decade. While there are substantial concerns about model reliability and robustness, we present estimates based on disaggregated county data models that on net the passage of the law in 24 jurisdictions has increased the annual cost of crime slightly - somewhere on the order of half a billion dollars. We also provide an illustration of how our jurisdiction-specific regression model has the capacity to generate more nuanced assessments concerning which states might profit from or be harmed by a particular legal intervention.

JEL Classifications: K0, H0, Z0

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 29, 2002 ; Last revised: April 07, 2003

Contact Information

John J. Donohue III (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-1994 (Phone)
203-432-1040 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Ian Ayres
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-7101 (Phone)
203-432-2592 (Fax)
Yale School of Management
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
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