Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria: a Framework for Analysis
Russell Cooper
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
October 1986
NBER Working Paper No. w2060
Abstract:
This paper examines the macroeconomic properties of imperfectly competitive economies. The focus is on the coordination failures that might arise in these economies, a study of alternative policies and the comparative static properties of these models. This paper differs from others in this area by modeling the labor market from the perspective of optimal contract theory. This permits an evaluation of the role of labor market behavior in producing these coordination failures and a study of labor market policies (such as unemployment insurance and alternative compensation schemes).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
working papers series
Suggested Citation
Cooper, Russell W., Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria: a Framework for Analysis (October 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w2060. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=344843
