'Third Party Contingency' Contracts in Settlement and Litigation

Center for the Study of Law and Economics Discussion Paper 2002-11

25 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2003

See all articles by Roland Kirstein

Roland Kirstein

University of Magdeburg - Economics of Business and Law

Neil Rickman

University of Surrey - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these "Third Party Contingency" (TPC) contracts.

Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPCs may generate the above strategic effect.

Keywords: contingent fees, British cost allocation rule, Legal Cost Insurance, strategic moves

JEL Classification: K41, C7, G22

Suggested Citation

Kirstein, Prof. Dr. Roland and Rickman, Neil, 'Third Party Contingency' Contracts in Settlement and Litigation (October 2002). Center for the Study of Law and Economics Discussion Paper 2002-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=346460 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.346460

Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein (Contact Author)

University of Magdeburg - Economics of Business and Law ( email )

Universitaetsplatz 2
Magdeburg, 39016
Germany
+493916718729 (Phone)
+493916711764 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/bizecon

Neil Rickman

University of Surrey - Department of Economics ( email )

Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
+44 1483 689 923 (Phone)
+44 1483 689 548 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
186
Abstract Views
2,230
Rank
145,776
PlumX Metrics