Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=347400
 
 

Citations



 


 



Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent


C. Edward Fee


Michigan State University - Department of Finance

Charles J. Hadlock


Michigan State University - The Eli Broad College of Business and The Eli Broad Graduate School of Management


Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We study the job movements of senior executives across firms. We find that executives who jump to CEO positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above-average stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an 'heir-apparent' on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance. Implications of these findings for issues related to managerial incentives, managerial retention, and incentive design are discussed.

Keywords: Career concerns, Outside CEOs, Performance measurement, Executive retention

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J33, J41

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 15, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Fee, C. Edward and Hadlock, Charles J., Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent. Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=347400

Contact Information

C. Edward Fee
Michigan State University - Department of Finance ( email )
The Eli Broad College of Business
315 Eppley Center
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States
517-353-2920 (Phone)
517-432-1080 (Fax)
Charles J. Hadlock (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - The Eli Broad College of Business and The Eli Broad Graduate School of Management ( email )
315 Eppley Center
East Lansing, MI 48824-1121
United States
517-353-9330 (Phone)
517-432-1080 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 727

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.266 seconds