Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium
Arizona State University - Department of Economics
ASU Working Paper 97/13
In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 18
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D43, D90working papers series
Date posted: November 18, 1997
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