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How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

Barak D. Richman
Duke University - School of Law



Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 2, Spring 2006
Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 65
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 384

Abstract:     
This paper argues that Jewish merchants have historically dominated the diamond industry because of their ability to reliably implement diamond credit sales. Success in the industry requires enforcing executory agreements that are beyond the reach of public courts, and Jewish diamond merchants enforce such contracts with a reputation mechanism supported by a distinctive set of industry, family, and community institutions. An industry arbitration system publicizes promises that are not kept. Intergenerational legacies induce merchants to deal honestly through their very last transaction, so that their children may inherit valuable livelihoods. And ultra-Orthodox Jews, for whom participation in their communities is paramount, provide important value-added services to the industry without posing the threat of theft and flight.

Keywords: Dispute Resolution, Private Ordering, Religion & Economics, Reputation Mechanisms

JEL Classifications: K12, L14, L22

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 17, 2005 ; Last revised: March 08, 2009

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D., How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York (Spring 2006). Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 2, Spring 2006; Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 65; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 384. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349040 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.349040


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Contact Information

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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