Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in Ipos with Better Long Run Returns?
36 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2003
There are 2 versions of this paper
Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in Ipos with Better Long Run Returns?
Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in Ipos With Better Long Run Returns?
Date Written: June 12, 2005
Abstract
We analyze allocations to institutional and retail investors in 441 initial public offerings (IPOs). In addition to the well known favorable first-day returns, we show that institutions also obtain more allocations in IPOs with better long-term performance. We find that initial institutional flips help predict future returns, suggesting that at least some institutions retain valuable private information about IPO firms. Collectively, these findings illustrate the importance of aftermarket relationships between underwriters and investors and that underwriters have discretionary means to compensate IPO investors beyond first-day returns and price stabilization.
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, IPO allocations, Flipping, IPO underpricing
JEL Classification: G12, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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