A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games
Marco A. Marini
Sapienza Università di Roma ; CREI, University Rome III
University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia
December 9, 2002
GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004
This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Cooperative Equilibrium, Coalitions
JEL Classification: C7
Date posted: February 21, 2003 ; Last revised: May 1, 2012
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