Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=351040
 
 

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A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games


Marco A. Marini


Sapienza Università di Roma ; CREI, University Rome III

Sergio Currarini


University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics

December 9, 2002

GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004

Abstract:     
This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Cooperative Equilibrium, Coalitions

JEL Classification: C7

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: February 21, 2003 ; Last revised: May 1, 2012

Suggested Citation

Marini, Marco A. and Currarini, Sergio, A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games (December 9, 2002). GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=351040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.351040

Contact Information

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)
Sapienza Università di Roma ( email )
Via Ariosto, 25
Rome, 00181
Italy
+390677274044 (Phone)
+390677274033 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/marini/
CREI, University Rome III ( email )
Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/
Sergio Currarini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )
Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom
Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics ( email )
Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
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