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A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form GamesMarco A. MariniSapienza Università di Roma ; CREI, University Rome III Sergio CurrariniUniversity of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics; Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (CMCC); Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan December 9, 2002 GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004 Abstract: This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21 Keywords: Cooperative Equilibrium, Coalitions JEL Classification: C7 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: February 21, 2003 ; Last revised: May 1, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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