Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance
Chris William Sanchirico
University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department; Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
George G. Triantis
Stanford Law School
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 04-10; Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 02-17
Contract theory identifies verifiability as a critical determinant of the incompleteness of contracts. Although verifiability refers to the cost of proving relevant facts to a court, very little scholarship connects explicitly the evidentiary process to the drafting of substantive contract terms. This paper begins to explore this relationship to provide a more rigorous explanation of contract design. In particular, the paper concerns the very core of verifiability - truth-finding by a court - and examines the impact of the prospect of evidence fabrication on contracting. It thereby also explores the puzzling tolerance of the adjudicatory system for fabrication and the incentives to fabricate created by thresholds in burdens of proof. The paper suggests that, despite undermining truth-finding, evidence fabrication may be harnessed by contracting parties to improve the (evidentiary) cost-efficiency of performance incentives in their relationship.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34working papers series
Date posted: July 15, 2004
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.312 seconds