Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=353260
 
 

Footnotes (24)



 


 



Liquidated Damages After Behavioral Law and Economics


Steven D. Walt


University of Virginia School of Law

December 2002

Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 02-18

Abstract:     
This paper briefly assesses defenses of the law of liquidated damages based on experimental evidence adduced by behavioral law and economics (BLE). It identifies three sorts of inference BLE frequently relies upon: a weak inference of rule design, a modest inference to limited application, and a strong inference to general application. BLE's lack of a unified and coherent theory of rational choice does not mean that its unconfirmed predictions are unsupportable. However, needed support must come indirectly, from defensible inferences drawn from experimental results. Because the defensible inferences from the results BLE relies on are limited to a restricted range of choice environments, they cannot support a broad legal rule that is to apply in most cases. Two consequences follow for the regulation of liquidated damages clauses. First, the inferences cannot support a rule of penalty regulation. At most, they justify exceptions that allow judicial oversight of liquidated damages clauses in particular circumstances. Because BLE's defensible inferences have a restricted range, they cannot themselves undermine the general presumption favoring the contracting parties' choice of value-maximizing terms. Second, the inferences cannot undermine arguments for limiting penalty regulation that do not rely on the processing of information. Arguments from measurement error resulting from restricted access to information about damages, such as Goetz and Scotts', are unaffected by findings of systemic cognitive failure in information processing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 26, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Walt, Steven D., Liquidated Damages After Behavioral Law and Economics (December 2002). Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 02-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=353260 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.353260

Contact Information

Steven D. Walt (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
804-924-7930 (Phone)
804-924-7536 (Fax)

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,238
Downloads: 329
Download Rank: 48,996
Footnotes:  24

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.828 seconds