Citations (36)


Footnotes (77)



Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience

Ronald J. Gilson

Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, April 2003

This paper seeks to identify the core of the U.S. venture capital contracting model, and then assess the extent to which the model provides guidance in engineering venture capital markets in other countries and, in particular, in identifying a viable role for government in assisting that project. All financial contracts respond to three central contracting problems: uncertainty, information asymmetry and opportunism in the form of agency costs. The special character of venture capital contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology companies presents these problems in extreme form. The genius of U.S. venture capital contracting lies in the use of powerful incentives coupled with powerful monitoring for all participants in the process, the braiding of the investor/venture capital fund and venture capital fund/portfolio company contracts, especially with respect to the role of exit and reputation, and the critical role of implicit contracts, especially through the reputation market, to support the dense set of explicit contracts comprising the structure of venture capital contracting. The paper then illustrates the implications of this analysis through consideration of three different government programs - a remarkably unsuccessful early effort in Germany; a more recent, more successful program in Israel; and a newly launched program in Chile.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: venture capital, incomplete contracting

JEL Classification: G24, G30, G32, G39, K12

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 4, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J., Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, April 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=353380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.353380

Contact Information

Ronald J. Gilson (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0614 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
B-1050 Brussels
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 12,205
Downloads: 3,267
Download Rank: 1,767
Citations:  36
Footnotes:  77

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.313 seconds