Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=354360
 
 

Footnotes (20)



 


 



The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead Counsel


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2002

Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 80, pp. 889-899, 2002
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 390

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the shortcomings of using auctions for selecting lead counsel in class action cases. In contrast to what proponents of auctions suggest, the outcome of an auction is likely to diverge considerably from what an informed principal would have chosen. In particular, auctions push the percentage of recovery paid to counsel to the lowest level at which law firms would be willing to take the case. Because of the need to provide counsel with incentives to invest effort and resources, however, the class might well be better served by a higher percentage than this minimum level, and auctions might push fees to levels that are too low. The analyzed problems are ones that arise also in those types of cases for which the use of auctions should be considered according to the recent recommendations of a Task Force report.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: class actions, lead counsel, attorney fees, contingent fees

JEL Classification: K4

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 24, 2002 ; Last revised: May 5, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead Counsel (2002). Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 80, pp. 889-899, 2002; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 390. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=354360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354360

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,850
Downloads: 292
Download Rank: 58,963
Footnotes:  20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.266 seconds