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Ownership: Evolution and Regulation


Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Stefano Rossi


Krannert School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

November 14, 2006

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 09/2003
EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 3205
AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection, equity financing and corporate ownership in the U.K. over the 20th century. Formal investor protection only emerged in the second half of the century. We assess its influence on ownership by comparing cross-sections of firms at different times in the century and the evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Investor protection had little impact on dispersion of ownership: even in the absence of investor protection, there was a high rate of dispersion of ownership, primarily associated with mergers. Ownership dispersion in the UK relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal systems of regulation. Preliminary evidence for this comes from the geographical proximity of shareholders to their boards of directors, the absence of price discrimination in takeovers and retention of directors of target boards in merged firms.

Note: Previously titled "The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control"

Number of Pages in PDF File: 68

Keywords: Evolution, ownership, investor protection, equity issues, trust

JEL Classification: G32, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: January 26, 2004 ; Last revised: June 30, 2008

Suggested Citation

Franks, Julian R., Mayer, Colin and Rossi, Stefano, Ownership: Evolution and Regulation (November 14, 2006). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 09/2003; EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 3205; AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings; Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=354381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354381

Contact Information

Julian R. Franks
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Stefano Rossi (Contact Author)
Krannert School of Management ( email )
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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