Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=359200
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (36)



 


 



Revenge and Retaliation


Vincy Fon


George Washington University - Department of Economics

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, Francesco Parisi, Vernon Smith, eds., Stanford University Press, 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-31

Abstract:     
This paper considers the role of retaliation norms as a way to induce more socially desirable behavior among self-interested parties. The paper first considers the unregulated case in which individuals indulge in mutual aggression, in the absence of other legal or social constraints. Next the relationship between aggressors and their victims is investigated, concentrating on the effect of victim's propensity to retaliate when suffering harm from others. Two retaliatory regimes are examined: proportional retribution and fixed retaliation. Special attention is paid to the impact of these regimes on the parties' interaction. The results suggest that human instincts for revenge may indeed be as important as honesty for the evolution of cooperation. More generally, retaliation norms are an important ingredient for the evolution of desirable social behavior in the absence of other social constraints or legal intervention.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Negative Reciprocity, Retaliation, Revenge, Vindictiveness

JEL Classification: D70, C7, Z13

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 12, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Fon, Vincy and Parisi, Francesco, Revenge and Retaliation. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, Francesco Parisi, Vernon Smith, eds., Stanford University Press, 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-31. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=359200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.359200

Contact Information

Vincy Fon
George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )
2115 G Street, N.W.
Monroe Hall, #366
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7580 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)
Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,015
Downloads: 579
Download Rank: 24,614
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  36

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.360 seconds