Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=360560
 
 

Citations



 


 



Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis


Marco Pagano


University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Fabio Panetta


Bank of Italy

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No.1, February 1998

Abstract:     
Using a large database of private firms in Italy, we analyze the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) by comparing the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts after high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by lower cost of credit and increased turnover in control.

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: February 23, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Pagano, Marco and Panetta, Fabio and Zingales, Luigi, Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No.1, February 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=360560

Contact Information

Marco Pagano (Contact Author)
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Fabio Panetta
Bank of Italy ( email )
Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy
+39 06 4792 4143 (Phone)
+39 06 4792 3723 (Fax)
Luigi Zingales
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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