Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=363680
 
 

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IAS versus US GAAP: Information Asymmetry-Based Evidence from Germany's New Market


Christian Leuz


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Financial Studies (CFS); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center; CESifo Research Network


Journal of Accounting Research, June 2003

Abstract:     
Motivated by the debate about globally uniform accounting standards, this paper investigates whether firms using US GAAP vis-a-vis IAS exhibit differences in several proxies for information asymmetry. The study exploits a unique setting where the two sets of standards are put on a level playing field. Firms trading in Germany's New Market must choose between IAS and US GAAP for financial reporting, but face the same regulatory environment otherwise. Thus, institutional factors such as listing requirements, market microstructure and standards enforcement are held constant. In this setting, differences in the bid-ask spread and share turnover between IAS and US GAAP firms are statistically insignificant and economically small. Subsequent analyses of analysts' forecast dispersion, IPO underpricing and firms' standard choices corroborate these findings. Thus, at least for New Market firms, the choice between IAS and US GAAP appears to be of little consequence for information asymmetry and market liquidity. These findings do not support widespread claims that US GAAP produce financial statements of higher informational quality than IAS.

Keywords: International accounting, Disclosure, Cost of capital, Accounting standards, Harmonization

JEL Classification: D82, G12, M41, M44, M45, M47, G30

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 21, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Leuz, Christian, IAS versus US GAAP: Information Asymmetry-Based Evidence from Germany's New Market. Journal of Accounting Research, June 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=363680

Contact Information

Christian Leuz (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-1996 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://chicagobooth.edu/fac/christian.leuz
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Center for Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
United States
CESifo Research Network
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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