Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 56-66, 2006
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-01
FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper
This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000), we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: Regulation, Commons, Legislatures, Duopoly
JEL Classification: K0, H1Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 6, 2003
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