Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=364241
 
 

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Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition


Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Norbert Schulz


University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center


International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 56-66, 2006
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-01
FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper

Abstract:     
This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000), we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: Regulation, Commons, Legislatures, Duopoly

JEL Classification: K0, H1

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Date posted: January 6, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Schulz, Norbert and Klick, Jonathan, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 56-66, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-01; FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=364241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.364241

Contact Information

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Norbert Schulz
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )
Sanderring 2
Lehrstuhl VWL III
D-97070 Wuerzburg
Germany
+49-931/31 29 60 (Phone)
+49-931/31 26 21 (Fax)
Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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