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Two Dimensions of Regulatory CompetitionFrancesco ParisiUniversity of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna Norbert SchulzUniversity of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics Jonathan KlickUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 56-66, 2006 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-01 FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper Abstract: This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000), we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17 Keywords: Regulation, Commons, Legislatures, Duopoly JEL Classification: K0, H1 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: January 6, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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