Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis
Kai A. Konrad
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 825
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: Altruism, Envy, Contests, Evolutionary Stability
JEL Classification: C72, D64, D74working papers series
Date posted: January 16, 2003
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