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Indirect Network Effects and Adoption Externalities

Jeffrey Church
University of Calgary - Economics

Neil Gandal
Tel Aviv University - Department of Public Policy; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David Krause
Bell Canada


December 19, 2002

Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Paper No. 02-30

Abstract:     
The conventional wisdom is that indirect network effects, unlike direct network effects, do not give rise to externalities. In this paper we show that under very general conditions, indirect network effects lead to adoption externalities. In particular we show that in markets where consumption benefits arise from hardware/software systems, adoption externalities will occur when there are (i) increasing returns to scale in the production of software, (ii) free-entry in software, and (iii) consumers have a preference for software variety. The private benefit of the marginal hardware purchaser is less than the social benefit since the marginal hardware purchaser does not internalize the welfare improving response of the software industry, particularly the increase in software variety, on inframarginal purchasers when the market for hardware expands.

Keywords: Network Externalities, Network Effects

JEL Classifications: D62, L13

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 24, 2003 ; Last revised: March 28, 2003

Suggested Citation

Church, Jeffrey, Gandal, Neil and Krause, David Peter, Indirect Network Effects and Adoption Externalities (December 19, 2002). Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Paper No. 02-30. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=369120 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.369120


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Contact Information

Jeffrey Church (Contact Author)
University of Calgary - Economics ( email )
2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada
Neil Gandal
Tel Aviv University - Department of Public Policy ( email )
School of Government and Policy
Tel Aviv 69978 Israel
+972 3 640 6742 (Phone)
+972 3 640 7382 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://spirit.tau.ac.il/public/gandal/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
David Peter Krause
Bell Canada ( email )
613-785-6344 (Phone)
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