Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
Burkhard C. Schipper
University of California, Davis - Department of Economics
Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common-Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
Keywords: imitation, price-taking behavior, lattice theory, stochastic stability
JEL Classification: C72, D21, D43, L13working papers series
Date posted: October 18, 2004
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