Who Monitors the Family?
Ronald C. Anderson
American University - Kogod School of Business
David M. Reeb
National University of Singapore
March 5, 2003
Founding families are in unique positions of power and control that enable them to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. However, recent research suggests that in large publicly trade companies, firms with founding family presence outperform those with more dispersed ownership structures. This raises the question of who monitors the family and alleviates these shareholder-shareholder conflicts. Using the Standard and Poor's 500 firms from 1992 to 1999, we document significant corporate governance differences between family and non-family firms. We find that the salient element in limiting family opportunism in US firms is the relative influence of independent and family directors. Overall, rather than focusing on divergences in family ownership and control as reported in East Asian firms, investors in US firms appear to focus on the presence of independent monitors to counterbalance family influence.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41
Keywords: ownership, large-shareholders, family firms, boards
JEL Classification: G3working papers series
Date posted: March 5, 2003
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